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Six buildings were overturned in the town of Onagawa during the 2011 Great East Japan 
tsunami. This study investigates the possible failure mechanisms of building overturning 
during tsunami flow. The tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity at each overturned 
building were recalculated by using a tsunami numerical simulation and verified using 
a recorded video. The overturning moment is a result of hydrodynamic and buoyancy 
forces, whereas the resisting moment is a result of building self-weight and pile resistance 
force. This study aimed to demonstrate that the building foundation design is critical for 
preventing buildings from overturning. The analysis results suggest that buoyancy force 
can generate a larger overturning moment than hydrodynamic force, and the failure of 
a pile foundation could occur during both ground shaking and tsunami flow. For the pile 
foundation, pile resistance force plays a significant role due to both tension and shear 
capacities at the pile head and skin friction capacity between the pile and soil, which can 
be calculated from 18 soil boring data in Onagawa using a conventional method in the 
AIJ standards. In addition, soil liquefaction can reduce skin friction capacity between the 
pile and soil resulting in a decrease of the resisting moment from pile resistance force.
Keywords: building overturning, Onagawa, tsunami flow, pile foundation, soil liquefaction
inTrODUcTiOn
During the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, many buildings were seriously 
damaged by a combination of ground shaking, tsunami flow, debris impact, and soil liquefaction. 
After the 2011 Great East Japan tsunami, overturned buildings were found unexpectedly in two 
locations: (1) six buildings [i.e., five reinforced concrete (RC) buildings and one steel-frame 
building] in the town of Onagawa in Miyagi Prefecture and (2) two buildings in the city 
of Miyako in Iwate Prefecture. This study focused on the overturned buildings in Onagawa 
because of the comprehensiveness of the building-related information, soil information, and 
tsunami simulation results. These overturned buildings were built more than 30  years ago 
over filled soil foundations. A field survey revealed that one of the six overturned buildings in 
Onagawa was built on a shallow foundation, and the other buildings had a pile foundation; one 
of the buildings was overturned and moved 70  m from its original position (Suppasri et  al., 
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2012; Latcharote et al., 2014). Based on inundation data, these 
overturned buildings were fully (or at least nearly) submerged 
and overturned by the following possible causes: (a) hydro-
dynamic force, including debris effects; (b) buoyancy force; 
and (c) weakened foundation associated with soil instability 
(Yeh et al., 2013). Therefore, the maximum inundation depth 
exceeded the height of all overturned buildings in Onagawa, 
and it was assumed that those buildings were overturned 
during the overtopping tsunami flow.
The one famous instance of an overturned RC building 
occurred in 1946 following an Aleutian tsunami, in which an 
18-m-tall lighthouse at a ground elevation of 10  m was over-
turned by a 30-m tsunami. In Japan, building overturning had 
not been reported in previous earthquakes and subsequent 
tsunamis and thus was not considered in building foundation 
design. However, building overturning is now considered in 
the design guidelines for building foundations (Architectural 
Institute of Japan, 2001), particularly for tsunami evacuation 
buildings. In recent years, the seismic performance design of 
pile foundations has considered the rocking of pile caps and the 
negative friction of piles to resist the uplift of buildings. During 
tsunami flow, building overturning can occur as a result of 
lateral force (hydrodynamic force) and uplift force (buoyancy 
force), the latter of which depends on the dimensions from the 
top of the window opening to the ceiling in buildings. Based on 
the surveyed data, most of the piles were likely broken by ten-
sion and shear failures at the pile head and insufficient friction 
between the pile and soil, including the effect of soil liquefaction, 
which caused the piles to be easily pulled out of the ground. 
During soil liquefaction, the soil shear strength is decreased, 
thereby decreasing the shaft resistance (skin friction) between 
the pile surface and soil around the pile (Fraser et  al., 2013). 
This decreased shaft resistance would allow the greater vertical 
movement of the piles while in the ground. The piles would 
then be pulled from the ground more easily when the building 
is subjected to uplift and lateral forces from tsunami flow and 
debris impact, which were significant in Onagawa due to the 
extreme inundation depth (Fraser et al., 2013). Soil liquefaction 
changed the soil properties and caused a loss of skin friction 
capacity between the pile and soil because of the loosening of 
soil around the pile.
Therefore, the building foundation would be the main con-
sideration of building overturning in Onagawa. The overturning 
mechanism of these overturned buildings has been thoroughly 
investigated in previous studies, such as Ishida et  al. (2015), 
Tokimatsu et al. (2016), and Yeh and Sato (2016), and few design 
considerations have been suggested. This study investigates the 
overturning mechanism in different ways and also considers the 
effect of soil liquefaction, which can result in a decrease of skin 
friction capacity between the pile and soil. Based on experimental 
studies of geotechnical problems, this study suggests a conven-
tional method to evaluate the approximate skin friction capacity 
when soil liquefaction occurs. The possible failure mechanism of 
the overturned buildings can then be investigated by comparing 
the overturning moment and resisting moment. The results of this 
study can be used to improve the recommendations for building 
foundation design in a building design code.
characTerisTics OF FiVe 
OVerTUrneD BUilDings
Our survey team observed that most of six overturned buildings 
in Onagawa had shifted away from sea and thus appeared to be 
overturned by striking wave. The tsunami force is estimated to 
be many tons per square meter with a long-period wave (e.g., 
30 min), which led to a prolonged interaction of tsunami flow 
acting on these overturned buildings. The water released from 
the uppermost floors of the buildings generated uplift force, 
which caused a large overturning moment with hydrodynamic 
force. Small openings were observed in these overturned build-
ings, which could also generate large uplift force. However, 
there was sufficient time for water to flow inside the buildings 
because of the long-period wave. Thus, only the accumulated air 
between the top of the windows and the ceiling generated buoy-
ancy force (Suppasri et al., 2013). The survey team also stated 
that most of the piles were probably pulled out and broken at 
the pile head as a result of ground shaking, hydrodynamic force, 
buoyancy force, and soil liquefaction. Five overturned buildings 
(i.e., Buildings A, B, C, D, and E) in Figure 1 were analyzed in 
this study, and the characteristics of each overturned building 
are provided below.
Building a
Building A is believed to have been built between 1965 and 
1970 adjacent to the shoreline (Onagawa, 2013). It was used as 
a repair shop of fishing boats in the past but was being used as 
a commercial store before the tsunami (Onagawa, 2013). The 
building was submerged by 0.4  m of seawater at high tide for 
many months after the tsunami due to the residual subsidence 
from the earthquake. The building was a three-story RC structure 
with a mat foundation on hard ground, as shown in Figure 2A. 
Small openings were observed on the face of this building subject 
to tsunami flow. As shown in Figure 1, this building overturned 
seaward, but it is expected that the initial failure was landward 
(consistent with the other buildings) and this building was then 
moved during tsunami return flow to its final position (Fraser 
et  al., 2013). On the other hand, the building may have been 
overturned seaward by the receding wave (Onagawa, 2013). Due 
to the mat foundation, only building self-weight could provide a 
resisting moment against the overturning moment from hydro-
dynamic and buoyancy forces.
Building B
Building B is believed to have been built between 1955 and 
1975 based on its type of foundation (Nikkei BP Company, 
2011). It was an accommodation building with a four-story 
RC structure and a pile foundation, as shown in Figure  2B. 
The pile foundation had 32 hollow concrete pipe piles with a 
pile diameter of 20  cm. This building was moved 70  m from 
its original position. As shown in Figure 2B, some piles were 
pulled from the ground, and some were broken under the 
foundation. Twelve of the 32 piles under the foundation appear 
to have been effective in resisting the overturning moment 
(Kabeyasawa et  al., 2012). No spiral reinforcing bar was 
observed inside the piles, but six longitudinal reinforcing bars 
FigUre 1 | six overturned buildings in the town of Onagawa and free-body-diagram of building overturning. Note: taken by our survey team in March 
29, 2011 at the town of Onagawa and Google Earth.
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were observed inside each pile. The settled ground around a 
neighboring building indicated the occurrence of soil liquefac-
tion (Tokimatsu et  al., 2012).
Building c
Building C is believed to have been built between 1980 and 1985 
(Onagawa, 2013). The building was used as an accommodation 
facility in the past but was being used as offices for private 
business and accommodations for sailors before the tsunami 
(Onagawa, 2013). The building was moved approximately 
10–16 m from its original location by the tsunami (Onagawa, 
2013). The building was submerged by 0.2  m of seawater at 
high tide for a short period after the tsunami. It was a four-
story steel-frame building with a pile foundation, as shown in 
Figure  2C. The pile foundation had 8 pile caps with 20 piles 
having a diameter of 25  cm. Most hollow concrete pipe piles 
failed at the connection to the pile cap under the foundation 
unless one pile on the upper right was pulled out. A spiral 
reinforcing bar and six longitudinal reinforcing bars were 
observed inside each pile, and the six reinforcing bars had 
ruptured. This building was constructed from steel frames and 
ALC walls; thus, building self-weight was less than that of RC 
buildings. This building was floated, carried away and then 
overturned by tsunami flow, and most of the piles were broken 
at their joints with the pile caps (Tokimatsu et  al., 2012).
Building D
Building D is believed to have been built between 1965 and 
1975 (Nikkei BP Company, 2011). It was used as a refrigerated 
warehouse with a two-story RC structure and a pile foundation, 
as shown in Figure  2D. The pile foundation had six pile caps 
with four piles with a diameter of 20  cm in each pile cap. All 
piles were broken at the pile caps. No spiral reinforcing bar was 
observed inside the piles, but six longitudinal reinforcing bars 
were observed inside each pile. This building was floated more 
than 1  m and moved approximately 7  m, and all piles were 
ruptured at or near the joints (Tokimatsu et al., 2012). No pile 
remained connected to the pile caps, suggesting a higher level 
of shear in the overturning motion than was experienced in the 
other overturned building with a pile foundation (Fraser et al., 
2013). This building was lifted by the hydrostatic buoyancy off of 
its pile foundation, which did not have tension capacity due to the 
minimal reinforcing steel (Chock et al., 2013). In addition, it was 
lifted off its original site and carried over a low wall before being 
deposited approximately 15 m inland from its original location 
(Chock et al., 2013).
Building e
Building E is believed to have been built in 1980 (Onagawa, 
2013). It was a police box on the first floor and a rest area on 
the second floor (Onagawa, 2013). The building was overturned 
AB
C
D
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FigUre 2 | continued
EFigUre 2 | The characteristics of five overturned buildings in the town of Onagawa. (a) Building A, (B) Building B, (c) Building C, (D) Building D, and 
(e) Building E. Note: taken by our survey team in March 29, 2011 and July 9, 2011 at the town of Onagawa.
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near its present location and then moved to its present location by 
the receding wave (Onagawa, 2013). Some damage from floating 
debris can be observed on the upper part of the building. The 
building was submerged by 0.3  m of seawater at high tide for 
a short period after the tsunami. The building was a two-story 
RC building with a pile foundation, as shown in Figure 2E. The 
pile foundation had 6 pile caps with 14 piles having a diameter 
of 25 cm, and most of the piles were pulled out of the ground. 
No spiral reinforcing bar was observed inside the piles, but six 
longitudinal reinforcing bars were observed inside each pile. 
The settled ground near a neighboring building indicates that 
liquefaction occurred (Tokimatsu et al., 2012).
FacTOrs inFlUencing BUilDing 
OVerTUrning
Tsunami inundation
Based on a video recorded from the rooftop of a building in 
Onagawa, a thorough analysis of the tsunami inundation was 
conducted using numerical modeling and measurements 
(Adriano et al., 2016). Numerical tsunami simulations were per-
formed to reproduce the calculated time series of tsunami flow 
using the tsunami source model proposed by the Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan. The simulations demonstrate that the 
maximum inundation depth due to the first incoming wave was 
over 16 m, and more than 500 buildings were washed away by 
this first wave, which is consistent with the video data (Adriano 
et al., 2016). The source model was verified with the observed 
tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity interpreted from 
the video record including the measured depth of maximum 
tsunami inundation of 30 points from tsunami watermark and 
the inundation area measured by field survey and satellite image 
analysis (Adriano et al., 2016). This study extended this reliable 
source model of tsunami numerical simulations to reproduce 
the waveforms of tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity 
at each overturned building. Then, these waveforms were used 
to estimate hydrodynamic and buoyancy forces in time series 
in order to investigate the possible mechanism of building 
overturning.
The tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity in the time 
series at each overturned building validated by the interpretation 
of the video data are shown in Figure 3. The peak inundation 
depth and peak flow velocity occurred at different times, which 
could result in the induction of large hydrodynamic force at any 
time during the striking or receding wave. Figure  3A shows 
the calculated time series of the tsunami inundation depth 
and flow velocity in 2014 (Adriano et  al., 2014). In this 2014 
simulation, the maximum inundation depth was not consistent 
with the video analysis, although the maximum flow velocity 
was somewhat consistent. Figure 3B shows the calculated time 
series of the tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity in 2016, 
including the crustal deformation (Adriano et al., 2016). In this 
2016 simulation, the maximum inundation depth was consistent 
with the video analysis, whereas the maximum flow velocity was 
lower than that of the video analysis. However, these numeri-
cal tsunami simulations were generated by the tsunami source 
model, which is typically used to reproduce tsunami propaga-
tion for all affected areas in Japan after the 2011 Great East Japan 
tsunami. This source model is not specific to only the studied 
area in Onagawa, which makes it different from other reverse 
models that attempt to be consistent with the video evidence. In 
this study, sets of inundation depth and flow velocity from both 
2014 and 2016 simulations were used to estimate hydrodynamic 
and buoyancy forces.
hydrodynamic Force
The overturning moment is partially the result of hydrodynamic 
force, which can be calculated from the inundation depth and 
flow velocity, as shown in Figure  3. This study assumed that 
these overturned buildings were surrounded by water and had a 
minimum unbalanced hydrostatic force, i.e., a minimum tsunami 
load. For each overturned building, hydrodynamic force (Fd) was 
applied as a uniform load over the depth of tsunami flow (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2011) as
 F C B hud s d= ( )12
2ρ ,  
where ρs is the density of salt water with sediment (1,200 kg/m3), 
Cd is the drag coefficient (2.0), B is the building width in the 
AB
FigUre 3 | Tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity from 2014 and 2016 simulations. (a) 2014 simulation and (B) 2016 simulation.
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plane normal to the direction of flow, h is the inundation depth 
or building height, and u is the flow velocity.
Buoyancy Force
The overturning moment is also partially the result of buoyancy 
force, which can be calculated from the inundation depth shown 
in Figure 3. For each overturned building, buoyancy force (Fb) 
was set equal to the water weight of the residual air space inside 
it, which also depends on the opening ratio. A residual air space 
ratio (Cb) of 0 indicates that the entire building was filled with 
water, whereas a residual air space ratio of 1.0 indicates that no 
water entered the building, expressed as
 F C gBDhb s b= ρ ,  
where ρs is the density of salt water with sediment (1,200  kg/
m3), Cb is the residual air space ratio varying with the relative 
volume of entrapped air inside the building (0.0–1.0), g is the 
gravitational acceleration (9.81 m/s2), B is the building width, 
D is the building depth, and h is the inundation depth or 
building height.
Building self-Weight
The resisting moment is also partially the result of building self-
weight, which can be calculated from the weight per unit area 
of the RC and steel buildings. The concrete density is typically 
2,400  kg/m3. In this study, the weight per unit area of the RC 
buildings is assumed to be 14 kPa, whereas the weight per unit 
area of the steel buildings is assumed to be 8 kPa.
Pile resistance Force
The resisting moment is also partially the result of pile resistance 
force, which can be calculated from the pile and soil. From the 
damage observed in the overturned buildings with a pile founda-
tion, two possible cases of pile damage were identified: tension 
or shear failure at the pile heads and pulling of the pile from the 
ground.
Tension and Shear Capacities
In the case of tension failure, pile resistance force (RTC) can be 
calculated from the fracture strength of the PC steel wire (Fu) 
inside the pile and from the shear strength of the pile section (Qu) 
for the case of shear failure. Tokimatsu et al. (2016) suggested the 
tension and shear capacities of piles in a pile foundation based on 
the catalog specifications.
Skin Friction Capacity
Eighteen soil boring data were obtained from the Onagawa 
office to represent the soil profiles of overturned buildings 
with pile foundations, as shown in Figure 4. The coastal area 
in Figure 4A (covered by the red-dashed line) was largely filled 
by soil (Onagawa, 1960). A soil boring data contains soil lay-
ers, such sand, gravel, silt, and clay, and N value, as shown in 
Figure 4B. In the case of pulling a pile out of the ground, pile 
resistance force (RTC) is calculated from skin friction capacity 
(Qs) between the pile and soil based on the recommendations 
for the design of building foundations (Architectural Institute 
of Japan, 2001) as
BA
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 Q L Ls st s ct c p= ∑ +∑( )τ τ ϕ ,  
where τst is the friction stress in a sand layer, Ls is the length of a 
sand layer, τct is the friction stress in a clay layer, Lc is the length 
of a clay layer, and φp is the peripheral length of a pile. In this 
equation,
 τst  N= 2 0. ,  
 τ β β αct u p f u u u   max  N= = = = ( )C C q q, L , / , , ,2 25 60  
where αp is the adhesive factor (0.5–1.0), Lf is the length index 
(0.7–1.0), and Cu is the average undrained shear strength.
The adhesive factor (αp) varies with the ratio of undrained 
shear strength and effective overburden pressure of silt and clay, 
whereas the length index (Lf) varies with the ratio of the layer 
thickness and the pile diameter.
soil liquefaction
In general, the evaluation of soil liquefaction during ground 
shaking and its effects on a pile foundation are highly com-
plex because the seismic ground motion at the site must be 
considered. In addition, the dissipation of pore-water pressure 
and lateral ground spreading must be considered to investigate 
their effects on the soil–pile interaction, which could be caused 
FigUre 4 | continued
FigUre 4 | 18 soil boring data in the town of Onagawa. (a) 18 boring locations (Google Earth). (B) Standard penetration test (SPT)-N value.
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by the main shock before the tsunami arrival. Therefore, the 
liquefaction process might be completed before the tsunami 
arrival and the shear strength of the soil might have recovered 
by the dissipation of pore-water pressure. However, it may take 
longer for the soil to regain its shear strength so it might occur 
within the several tens of minutes between the main shock 
and tsunami arrival, such as with the repeated occurrence 
of soil liquefaction in New Zealand within a year due to the 
September 2010 Canterbury earthquake and the February 2011 
Christchurch earthquake.
Because soil liquefaction is an interaction between soil and 
water, it takes time for the soil and water to slide out. Based on 
field surveys after two earthquakes in Japan, Mizutani (2008) 
reported that the soil liquefaction process took considerably 
longer than the ground shaking process. In the case of the 
1964 Niigata earthquake, the sand boiling started after the 
ground shaking ended, and a large amount of soil boiling was 
observed for more than 10 to several tens of minutes. In the 
case of the 1983 Japan Sea earthquake, there was a report of 
a large sand boil hole with a diameter of 8  m and a depth of 
1.5  m that sprayed soil with to a height of 10  m (Japanese 
Geotechnical Society, Tohoku Branch, 1986), and the outflow 
of water lasted for more than half a day. Therefore, the direct 
damage caused by strong ground shaking occurs over several 
tens of seconds, whereas the indirect damage caused by soil 
liquefaction requires much more time, and thus is responsible 
for minimal or no fatalities.
Yeh et  al. (2013) suggested that soil liquefaction due to 
strong ground shaking of the earthquake that had occurred 
approximately 40  min prior to the tsunami arrival may have 
further promoted overturning failure. Fraser et  al. (2013) 
also suggested that although any evidence of liquefaction 
was washed away in the tsunami, it may have contributed by 
loosening the soil around the piles prior to the overturning 
motion. Although, the liquefaction process in Onagawa is still 
not fully understood, it is worth considering the effect of soil 
liquefaction based on a building design standard because the 
2011 tsunami arrived at Onagawa within approximately 40 min 
9Latcharote et al. Possible Mechanism of Overturned Buildings
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of its initiation, when soil liquefaction could not have been 
negligible. In this study, cases with and without soil liquefaction 
will be analyzed and compared.
eFFecT OF sOil liQUeFacTiOn On sKin 
FricTiOn caPaciTY
The possibility of soil liquefaction might not have been consid-
ered in the design of these overturned buildings because the 
effect of soil liquefaction on pile foundation had likely not been 
clearly described. Many factors influence the occurrence of soil 
liquefaction, such as the earthquake magnitude, peak ground 
acceleration, and soil condition. The Technical Standard Manual 
for Building [Building Center of Japan (BCJ), 2007] proposed the 
determination of soil conditions, such as liquefaction hazards. It 
suggested that soil liquefaction can occur in sandy soil based 
on four conditions, including alluvium within 20  m from the 
ground surface, saturated soil, less fine particles, and a lower 
N value. In this study, a conventional method based on the AIJ 
standards was used to evaluate the effect of soil liquefaction on 
the pile foundations. Based on the recommendations for design 
of building foundations (Architectural Institute of Japan, 2001), 
a description of the soil properties in this conventional method 
can be used to calculate the safety factor of each soil layer against 
the occurrence of soil liquefaction. This safety factor indicates 
the potential for soil liquefaction, which can cause a loss of skin 
friction between the soil and pile and result in a reduction of total 
pile resistance force.
Because boring data were not available at the exact location 
of each overturned building, skin friction capacity was evalu-
ated from 18 boring data in an adjacent area. The majority of 
the filled soil at these 18 boring locations contains sand and 
gravel, which can cause a loss of skin friction between the pile 
and soil when soil liquefaction occurs. With this assumption, 
the conventional method was sufficient to calculate skin friction 
capacity when soil liquefaction occurs. Based on the report 
from field surveys after the 2011 Great East Japan tsunami 
(National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management 
(NILIM) and Building Research Institute (BRI) in Japan, 
2012), a sample calculation of skin friction capacity from this 
conventional method for boring No. 1 in Figure 4 is shown in 
Table 1. Skin friction capacity (Qs) can be calculated from the 
friction stress of the pile in sand and clay layers. The objective 
of this conventional method is to evaluate skin friction capacity 
when soil liquefaction occurs ( )′Qs , as shown in Table  1. The 
soil parameters in Table 1 are explained in Table 2. The cyclic 
resistance ratio (CRR) and cyclic stress ratio (CSR) were used 
to calculate the safety factor (FS), which can determine skin 
friction capacity during soil liquefaction as
 
FS CRR
CSR
= ,
 
 
CRR a a= + ( ) 0 041 0 00903 10
7. . / ,N N
 
 
CSR  n max d n= ′ = −( )γ
α σ
σ
γ γg M
z
z
, . ,0 1 1
 
where M is the earthquake magnitude, αmax is the peak ground 
acceleration, and γd is the stress reduction factor, which equal 
to 1 − 0.015z.
The CRR can be estimated from the N value of the standard 
penetration test, and the CSR can be estimated from the peak 
ground acceleration and earthquake magnitude. As noted above, 
sand and gravel may cause a loss of skin friction capacity between 
the pile and soil when soil liquefaction occurs. As shown in 
Table 1, skin friction capacity becomes 0 if the safety factor is less 
than 1. Total pile resistance force of each pile was calculated by the 
summation of all soil layers multiplied by the peripheral length 
of a pile. To calculate the resisting moment from pile resistance 
forces, the load distribution on the pile group was considered 
for the summation of all piles. From these 18 boring data in 
the adjacent area, skin friction capacity in each pile length was 
evaluated, resulting in a decrease of total pile resistance force, as 
shown in Table 3. The overturning moment from hydrodynamic 
and buoyancy forces and the resisting moment from building 
self-weight and pile resistance force were considered to investi-
gate possible overturning mechanisms in the next section.
POssiBle OVerTUrning MechanisM
When investigating the possible mechanism of each overturned 
building, the overturning moment is the result of hydrodynamic 
and buoyancy forces, whereas the resisting moment is the result 
of building self-weight and pile resistance force. For a pile founda-
tion, all of the piles could fail during the ground shaking due to 
large base shear force between the pile heads and pile caps; thus, 
the overturned buildings could resist tsunami flow using only 
their building self-weight. These overturned buildings floated 
and then moved from their original positions, so buoyancy 
force rapidly exceeded building self-weight after overturning. 
However, all piles may also have still been in good condition to 
resist tsunami flow after the ground shaking. Thus, two possible 
mechanisms of these overturned buildings with pile foundation 
are tension failure at the pile heads and pulling of the piles out of 
the ground.
Potential shear Failure of Piles during 
ground shaking
For low-rise regular buildings, equivalent static seismic loads 
are sufficient to consider base shear force instead of dynamic 
loads during the ground shaking. The equivalent static seismic 
loads can be calculated based on a response spectrum analysis 
using natural period. Based on the AIJ Recommendations for 
Loads on Buildings (Architectural Institute of Japan, 2004), a 
simplified method can be used to evaluate the equivalent static 
seismic loads from the observed response spectrum at the site 
and an approximation of natural period (T1) for each overturned 
building. Therefore, the approximate base shear force (VB) can be 
calculated as
 
V Sg WB
a= 0 816. ,
 
 T hh1 0 02 0 01= +( ). . ,α  
TaBle 2 | Description of each parameter (architectural institute of 
Japan, 2001).
symbol soil properties Determination method
N Standard penetration  
test (SPT)-N value
Obtained from SPT
γ Unit weight of soil Assumed from each soil 
type
′σz Effective stress (γ − γw)h
σz Absolute stress γh
FC Fine particle ratio Estimated from each soil 
type (only sand and gravel)
D50 50% Particle size Estimated from each soil 
type (only sand and gravel)
Na Corrected N value Na = N1 + Nf
N1 Conversed value of N N1 = CNN, CN z= ′1/ σ
Nf Correction factor for  
fine content
Varied with fine particle 
ratio
TaBle 1 | evaluation of skin friction capacity for boring no. 1.
z (m) h (m) soil type N γ  
(kg/m3)
′σ z (kPa) σz (kPa) Fc (%) D50 (m) Na crr csr 
(500 gal)
Fs 
(500 gal)
Qs/φp 
(kn/m)
′Qs p/ϕ  
(kn/m)
1.00 1.00 Sandy gravel mixed 
with clay (fill)
– – – – – – – – – – – –
1.60 0.60 5 2,100 6.47 12.36 15 0.03 16 0.17 0.76 0.23 6.00 0.00
2.00 0.40 Silty fine sand (fill) 5 1,800 9.61 19.42 15 23 0.32 0.80 0.39 4.00 0.00
2.70 0.70 3 1,800 15.11 31.78 15 15 0.16 0.82 0.20 4.20 0.00
3.00 0.30 Sandy silt (fill) 3 1,800 17.46 37.08 3.94 3.94
3.25 0.25 4 1,800 19.42 41.50 4.38 4.38
4.00 0.75 Silty sand (fill) 4 1,800 25.31 54.74 15 15 0.16 0.83 0.20 6.00 0.00
4.50 0.50 22 1,800 29.23 63.57 15 47 18.80 0.83 22.72 22.00 22.00
5.00 0.50 Sandy gravel mixed 
with pebble (fill)
22 2,100 34.63 73.87 0.005 26 0.48 0.81 0.60 22.00 0.00
6.00 1.00 31 2,100 45.42 94.47 0.005 32 1.39 0.77 1.80 62.00 62.00
7.00 1.00 8 2,100 56.21 115.07 0.005 7 0.11 0.75 0.15 16.00 0.00
7.95 0.95 30 2,100 66.46 134.64 0.005 25 0.45 0.73 0.62 57.00 0.00
8.00 0.05 Sandy silt mixed with 
gravel
30 1,800 66.86 135.53 6.56 6.56
8.60 0.60 10 1,800 71.56 146.12 26.25 26.25
9.00 0.40 Sandy gravel 10 2,100 75.88 154.36 0.002 9 0.12 0.72 0.17 8.00 0.00
10.00 1.00 11 2,100 86.67 174.96 0.002 9 0.13 0.70 0.18 22.00 0.00
10.40 0.40 8 2,100 90.99 183.20 0.002 7 0.11 0.69 0.15 6.40 0.00
11.00 0.60 Silty clay 8 1,500 93.93 192.03 21.00 21.00
11.45 0.45 5 1,500 96.14 198.65 9.84 9.84
12.00 0.55 Sandy gravel 5 2,100 102.07 209.98 0.002 4 0.08 0.69 0.12 5.50 0.00
13.00 1.00 9 2,100 112.86 230.58 0.002 7 0.11 0.67 0.16 18.00 0.00
13.90 0.90 10 2,100 122.58 249.12 0.002 7 0.11 0.66 0.17 18.00 0.00
14.00 0.10 Fine sand mixed 
with silt
10 1,950 123.51 251.04 9 0.12 0.66 0.19 2.00 0.00
14.50 0.50 13 1,950 128.17 260.60 11 0.14 0.65 0.21 13.00 0.00
14.80 0.30 Clay mixed with gravel 13 1,500 129.64 265.02 17.06 17.06
15.00 0.20 Sandy gravel 13 2,100 131.80 269.14 0.002 9 0.12 0.65 0.19 5.20 0.00
16.00 1.00 18 2,100 142.59 289.74 0.002 12 0.14 0.63 0.23 36.00 0.00
17.00 1.00 15 2,100 153.38 310.34 0.002 10 0.13 0.62 0.21 30.00 0.00
18.00 1.00 28 2,100 164.17 330.94 0.002 17 0.19 0.60 0.31 56.00 0.00
19.00 1.00 25 2,100 174.96 351.54 0.002 15 0.16 0.59 0.28 50.00 0.00
20.00 1.00 50 2,100 185.75 372.14 0.002 29 0.83 0.57 1.45 100.00 100.00
21.00 1.00 50 2,100 196.54 392.74 0.002 28 0.72 0.56 1.28 100.00 100.00
22.00 1.00 22 2,100 207.33 413.34 0.002 12 0.14 0.55 0.26 44.00 0.00
23.00 1.00 29 2,100 218.13 433.95 0.002 15 0.17 0.53 0.32 58.00 0.00
24.00 1.00 26 2,100 228.92 454.55 0.002 13 0.15 0.52 0.30 52.00 0.00
24.35 0.35 44 2,100 232.69 461.76 0.002 23 0.31 0.51 0.60 30.80 0.00
– – Bedrock – – – – – – – – – – – –
′RTC: pile resistance force in case of soil liquefaction.
φp: peripheral length of a pile.
The red color represents that the safety factor (FS) is less than 1.0, so that Qs become zero.
The bold font represents the pile length of 4.0 m, 6.0 m, and 8.0 m in Table 3.
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where Sa is the acceleration response at the base of the foundation, 
g is the gravitational acceleration (9.81  m/s2), W is building 
self-weight, and αh is the ratio of steel-frame height to total 
building height (h).
The base shear force was compared with total shear capacity of 
the piles in Section “Tension and Shear Capacities” to investigate 
the potential shear failure of the piles during ground shaking using 
a safety factor between total shear capacity (∑Qu) and base shear 
force (VB). Table 4 shows the calculation of total shear capacity 
and base shear force for Buildings B, C, D, and E. The accelera-
tion response (Sa) was obtained from the response spectrum in 
Ishinomaki city that was provided by NIED, which is the nearest 
available data to Onagawa [National Research Institute for Earth 
Science and Disaster Resilience (accessed 2016)]. Based on the 
safety factor, all piles of Building D failed during the ground 
shaking due to large base shear force between the pile heads and 
FigUre 5 | Mat foundation of Building a and pile foundation of Building D. Note: taken by our survey team in March 29, 2011 at the town of Onagawa.
TaBle 4 | Total shear capacity (∑Qu) and base shear force (VB) at pile foundation.
Building number of piles Fu (kn) Qu (kn) ∑Qu (kn) T1 (s) Sa (gal) W (kn) VB (kn) safety factor
B 32 153 65 2,080 0.28 1,050 2,320 2,030 1.02
C 20 306 177 3,540 0.43 1,000 3,340 2,780 1.27
D 24 153 65 1,560 0.21 1,400 7,240 8,430 0.18
E 14 306 177 2,478 0.14 1,100 1,780 1,630 1.52
TaBle 3 | skin friction capacity of 18 soil boring data for each pile length.
Boring data Pile length  
4.0 m
Pile length  
6.0 m
Pile length 
8.0 m
Qs/φp Q's/φp Qs/φp Q's/φp Qs/φp Q's/φp
No. 1 28.51 8.31 134.51 92.31 214.08 98.88
No. 2 128.00 102.00 200.00 102.00 248.00 102.00
No. 3 106.00 36.00 238.00 136.00 276.00 136.00
No. 4 92.00 0.00 134.00 0.00 172.00 0.00
No. 5 38.00 0.00 64.00 0.00 118.50 52.50
No. 6 117.50 117.50 152.50 152.50 176.13 176.13
No. 7 231.75 231.753 262.38 262.38 303.06 303.06
No. 8 62.00 31.20 90.00 31.20 124.00 31.20
No. 9 66.55 43.75 106.55 43.75 148.55 43.75
No. 10 31.50 31.50 52.50 52.50 79.33 76.13
No. 11 24.00 0.00 38.00 0.00 48.00 0.00
No. 12 18.00 0.00 42.00 0.00 78.00 0.00
No. 13 31.50 31.50 49.90 48.30 165.90 148.30
No. 14 16.00 0.00 32.93 6.13 238.55 211.75
No. 15 106.00 42.00 156.00 42.00 356.00 242.00
No. 16 102.38 102.38 426.13 426.13 736.75 736.75
No. 17 164.00 146.00 262.25 243.25 283.25 264.25
No. 18 166.00 100.00 202.00 100.00 312.00 200.00
Unit (kN/m): force per peripheral length of pile.
Pile length: depth (z) from ground in Table 1.
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pile caps, whereas all piles of Buildings C and E were still in a 
sufficiently good condition to resist tsunami. In addition, some 
piles of Building B could have failed during the ground shaking 
because the safety factor is close to 1.00, as shown in Table 4.
Overturned Buildings resisted by Only 
Building self-Weight
The possible overturning mechanism of Buildings A and D was 
investigated by comparing the overturning moment calculated 
from hydrodynamic force (Fd) and buoyancy force (Fb) to the 
resisting moment calculated from building self-weight (W). 
Building A had a mat foundation, and all piles of Building 
D failed during the ground shaking, as shown in Figure  5. 
Figure 6A shows the tsunami inundation depths and flow veloci-
ties at Buildings A and D in the 2014 and 2016 simulations. The 
residual air space ratio (Cb) was estimated based on the condition 
of larger buoyancy force than building self-weight, as shown in 
Figure 6B. The residual air space ratios for Buildings A and D 
were approximately 0.6 and 0.4, respectively. Figure  6C shows 
the time series of the overturning moment (Md and Mb) and the 
resisting moment (Mw).
As shown in Table 5, a comparison of Building A based on 
the 2014 simulation reveals that the peak overturning moment 
(Md + Mb) that occurred at 15:28 was 1.59 times higher than 
the resisting moment (Mw), whereas a comparison based on the 
2016 simulation suggests that the peak overturning moment 
that occurred at 15:29 was 1.84 times higher than the resisting 
moment. The peak overturning moment in the 2014 simulation 
occurred when the inundation depth was 10.60  m and the 
flow velocity was 2.83 m/s2, whereas the maximum depth and 
velocity of 13.50  m and 4.57  m/s2, respectively, occurred at 
different times, as shown in Figure 6A. The peak overturning 
moment in the 2016 simulation occurred when the inundation 
depth was 11.43 m and the flow velocity was 3.48 m/s2, whereas 
the maximum depth of 16.18 m occurred at different times, as 
shown in Figure  6A. Building A was only 10.5  m tall; thus, 
it was overturned when the tsunami flow exceeded the top of 
the building.
All piles of Building D failed during the ground shaking by 
shear failure between the pile heads and pile caps, in which 
the shear strength of a pile (Qu) was 65  kN, as shown in 
Table  4. As  shown in Table  5, a comparison of Building D 
TaBle 5 | analysis results of all overturned buildings.
analysis results Building a Building B Building c Building D Building e
2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016 2014 2016
Maximum inundation depth (m) 13.50 16.18 13.19 16.02 13.18 16.27 13.05 15.93 13.63 15.88
Maximum flow velocity (m/s2) 4.57 3.48 4.90 3.03 4.43 2.43 4.07 3.02 3.82 3.15
Residual air space ratio (Cb) 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6
Max depth (m) at peak overturning moment 10.60 11.43 8.71 12.45 8.61 12.14 9.98 10.43 7.06 10.57
Max vel. (m/s2) at peak overturning moment 2.83 3.48 3.73 2.10 3.77 1.95 2.02 2.71 3.48 3.15
Time at peak overturning moment 15:28 15:29 15:27 15:30 15:27 15:30 15:27 15:29 15:26 15:29
Overturning ratio (OR) 1.59 1.84 1.61 1.59 1.17 1.24 1.33 1.59 1.47 1.34
A
B
C
FigUre 6 | analysis results of Buildings a and D from 2014 and 2016 simulations. (a) Tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity. (B) Building self-weight, 
buoyancy force, and hydrodynamic force. (c) Resisting moment from building self-weight and overturning moment from hydrodynamic and buoyancy forces.
12
Latcharote et al. Possible Mechanism of Overturned Buildings
Frontiers in Built Environment | www.frontiersin.org March 2017 | Volume 3 | Article 16
based on the 2014 simulation reveals that the peak overturning 
moment (Md + Mb) that occurred at 15:27 was 1.33 times higher 
than the resisting moment (Mw), whereas a comparison based 
on the 2016 simulation suggests that the peak overturning 
moment that occurred at 15:29 was 1.59 times higher than the 
resisting moment. The peak overturning moment in the 2014 
FigUre 7 | Pile foundation of Building c (one pile pulled out of ground). Note: taken by our survey team in March 29, 2011 at the town of Onagawa.
A
B
C
FigUre 8 | analysis results of Building c from 2014 and 2016 
simulations. (a) Tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity. (B) Building 
self-weight, buoyancy force, and hydrodynamic force. (c) Resisting moment 
from building self-weight and pile resistance force, and overturning moment 
from hydrodynamic and buoyancy forces.
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simulation occurred when the inundation depth was 9.98  m 
and the flow velocity was 2.02  m/s2, whereas the maximum 
depth and velocity of 13.05  m and 4.07  m/s2, respectively, 
occurred at different times, as shown in Figure 6A. The peak 
overturning moment in the 2016 simulation occurred when 
the inundation depth was 10.43  m and the flow velocity was 
2.71 m/s2, whereas the maximum depth and velocity of 15.93 m 
and 3.02  m/s2, respectively, occurred at different times, as 
shown in Figure  6A. Building D was 10.5  m tall; thus, it 
was overturned when the tsunami flow was lower than the 
top of the building.
Another observation is that buoyancy force could generate 
an overturning moment larger than hydrodynamic force, par-
ticularly for Building D, as shown in Figure 6C. After building 
overturning occurred at 15:28, these buildings floated and then 
moved from their original positions such that buoyancy force 
was immediately greater than building self-weight, as shown 
in Figure 6B.
Tension Failure of Piles caused by 
Overturning Moment
The overturning mechanism of Building C was investigated by 
comparing the overturning moment calculated from hydro-
dynamic force (Fd) and buoyancy force (Fb) to the resisting 
moment calculated from building self-weight (W) and pile 
resistance force (RTC). Building C had a pile foundation and 
all of the piles failed by tension failure at the pile heads, except 
for one pile at the top-right pile cap, as shown in Figure  7. 
Figure  8A shows the tsunami inundation depth and flow 
velocity at Building C in the 2014 and 2016 simulations. The 
residual air space ratio (Cb) was approximately 0.5, as estimated 
based on the condition of larger buoyancy force than building 
self-weight, as shown in Figure 8B. Figure 8C shows the time 
series of the overturning moment (Md and Mb) and the resisting 
moment (Mw and Mr).
For Building C, the pile foundation failed during tsunami flow 
through the observed tension failure between the pile heads and 
pile caps in which the tensile strength of a pile (Fu) was 307 kN, as 
shown in Table 4. The effective piles out of the 20 piles were used 
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to calculate the resisting moment (Mr), with 4.0-m moment arm 
on the pile group equal to the pile length, as shown in Figure 7. 
As shown in Table 5, a comparison of Building C based on the 
2014 simulation reveals that the peak overturning moment 
(Md + Mb) that occurred at 15:27 was 1.17 times higher than the 
resisting moment (Mw +  Mr), whereas a comparison based on 
the 2016 simulation suggests that the peak overturning moment 
that occurred at 15:30 was 1.24 times higher than the resisting 
moment. The peak overturning moment in the 2014 simulation 
occurred when the inundation depth was 8.61 m and the flow 
velocity was 3.77 m/s2, whereas the maximum depth and velocity 
of 13.18 m and 4.43 m/s2, respectively, occurred at different times, 
as shown in Figure 8A. The peak overturning moment in the 2016 
simulation occurred when the inundation depth was 12.14 m and 
the flow velocity was 1.95 m/s2, whereas the maximum depth and 
velocity of 16.27 m and 2.43 m/s2, respectively, occurred at dif-
ferent times, as shown in Figure 8A. Building C was 14.2 m tall; 
thus, it was overturned when tsunami flow was lower than the 
top of the building.
Buoyancy force could generate an overturning moment equal 
to the resisting moment, as shown in Figure  8C. Therefore, 
although hydrodynamic force could generate a smaller overturn-
ing moment than buoyancy force, the additional overturning 
moment from hydrodynamic force had a significant impact on 
building overturning.
Pulling out of Piles including effect  
of soil liquefaction
The overturning mechanisms of Buildings B and E were inves-
tigated by comparing the overturning moment calculated from 
hydrodynamic force (Fd) and buoyancy force (Fb) to the resisting 
moment calculated from building self-weight (W) and pile resist-
ance force (RTC). Building B had a pile foundation, and 12 piles 
were pulled out of the ground, as shown in Figure  9, whereas 
20 piles might have failed as a result of base shear force during 
the ground shaking because the safety factor was close to 1.00, as 
shown in Table 4. Building E had a pile foundation, and all piles 
were pulled out of the ground except for one pile that failed in 
tension, as shown in Figure  9. Figure  10A shows the tsunami 
inundation depths and flow velocities at Buildings B and E in the 
2014 and 2016 simulations. The residual air space ratio (Cb) was 
estimated based on the condition of larger buoyancy force than 
building self-weight, as shown in Figure  10B. The residual air 
space ratios for Buildings B and E were approximately 0.7 and 0.6, 
respectively. Figure 10C shows the time series of the overturning 
moment (Md and Mb) and the resisting moment (Mw and Mr).
For Building B, boring No. 11 at the nearest location and the 
assumed pile length of 6 m were used to calculate skin friction 
capacity (Qs) of a pile, which was 38 kN/m, for a pile diameter of 
20 cm, as shown in Table 3. As shown in Table 5, the comparison 
of Building B based on the 2014 simulation reveals that the peak 
overturning moment (Md + Mb) that occurred at 15:27 was 1.61 
times higher than the resisting moment (Mw +  Mr), whereas 
the comparison based on the 2016 simulation suggests that the 
peak overturning moment that occurred at 15:30 was 1.59 times 
higher than the resisting moment. The peak overturning moment 
in the 2014 simulation occurred when the inundation depth was 
8.71 m and the flow velocity was 3.73 m/s2, whereas the maxi-
mum depth and velocity of 13.19 m and 4.90 m/s2, respectively, 
occurred at different times, as shown in Figure 10A. The peak 
overturning moment in the 2016 simulation occurred when the 
inundation depth was 12.45 m and the flow velocity was 2.10 m/
s2, as the maximum depth and velocity of 16.02 m and 3.03 m/s2, 
respectively, occurred at different times, as shown in Figure 10A. 
Building B was 14.0 m tall; thus, it was overturned when tsunami 
flow was lower than the top of the building.
For Building E, boring No. 5 at the nearest location and the 
assumed pile length of 6 m were used to calculate skin friction 
FigUre 9 | Pile foundation of Buildings B and e. (a) Red circles are 12 piles pulled out of ground, and gray circles are 20 piles broken during ground shaking. 
(B) Only one pile failed in tension. Note: taken by our survey team in March 29, 2011 at the town of Onagawa.
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A
B
C
FigUre 10 | analysis results of Buildings B and e from 2014 and 2016 simulations. (a) Tsunami inundation depth and flow velocity. (B) Building self-weight, 
buoyancy force, and hydrodynamic force. (c) Resisting moment from building self-weight and pile resistance force, and overturning moment from hydrodynamic 
and buoyancy forces.
capacity (Qs) of a pile, which was 64 kN/m, for a pile diameter 
of 25 cm, as shown in Table 3. As shown in Table 5, the com-
parison of Building B based on the 2014 simulation in reveals 
that the peak overturning moment (Md +  Mb) that occurred 
at 15:26 was 1.47 times higher than the resisting moment 
(Mw + Mr), whereas the comparison based on the 2016 simula-
tion suggests that the peak overturning moment that occurred 
at 15:29 was 1.34 times higher than resisting moment. The peak 
overturning moment in the 2014 simulation occurred when the 
inundation depth was 7.06 m and the flow velocity was 3.48 m/
s2, whereas the maximum depth and velocity of 13.63 m and 
3.82 m/s2, respectively, occurred at different times, as shown in 
Figure 10A. The peak overturning moment in 2016 occurred 
when the inundation depth was 10.57 m and the flow velocity 
was 3.15 m/s2, whereas the maximum depth and velocity were 
15.88 m and 3.15 m/s2, respectively, occurred at different times, 
as shown in Figure  10A. Building E was 7.0  m tall; thus, it 
was overturned when tsunami flow exceeded the top of the 
building.
The overturning ratio (OR) in Table 5 can be calculated from 
the ratio between the peak overturning moment and the peak 
resisting moment. For each of 18 soil boring data, skin friction 
capacity (Qs) is shown in Table 3 for pile lengths of 4.0, 6.0, and 
8.0 m and including the effect of soil liquefaction ( )′Qs . However, 
the conventional method to evaluate the effect of soil liquefac-
tion tends to overestimate liquefaction hazards (Chen et  al., 
2016). These 18 boring data were used to evaluate the potential 
of overturning for Buildings B and E based on the ORs, which can 
be classified as no possibility, low possibility, medium possibility, 
or high possibility.
Table  6 shows the ORs of Buildings B and E in the 2014 
and 2016 simulations considering the pile length and soil 
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TaBle 6 | Overturning ratio (Or) of Buildings B and e for each soil boring data.
Building
B
2014
Boring
data
Pile length
4.0 m
Pile length
6.0 m
Pile length
8.0 m
OR OR' OR OR' OR OR'
No.1 1.67 1.80 1.21 1.36 1.00 1.33
No.2 1.23 1.32 1.03 1.32 0.93 1.32
No.3 1.31 1.62 0.95 1.20 0.89 1.20
No.4 1.36 1.86 1.21 1.86 1.10 1.86
No.5 1.61 1.86 1.48 1.86 1.26 1.54
No.6 1.27 1.27 1.16 1.16 1.09 1.09
No.7 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.91 0.84 0.84
No.8 1.49 1.65 1.37 1.65 1.24 1.65
No.9 1.47 1.58 1.30 1.58 1.17 1.58
No.10 1.65 1.65 1.54 1.54 1.41 1.42
No.11 1.69 1.86 1.61 1.86 1.56 1.86
No.12 1.73 1.86 1.59 1.86 1.42 1.86
No.13 1.65 1.65 1.55 1.56 1.12 1.17
No.14 1.75 1.86 1.64 1.81 0.95 1.01
No.15 1.31 1.59 1.15 1.59 0.77 0.95
No.16 1.32 1.32 0.69 0.69 0.47 0.47
No.17 1.12 1.17 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.91
No.18 1.12 1.33 1.03 1.33 0.83 1.03
Building
E
2014
Boring
data
Pile length
4.0 m
Pile length
6.0 m
Pile length
8.0 m
OR OR' OR OR' OR OR'
No.1 1.88 2.10 1.22 1.42 0.96 1.38
No.2 1.25 1.37 1.00 1.37 0.89 1.37
No.3 1.35 1.81 0.91 1.21 0.83 1.21
No.4 1.42 2.20 1.22 2.20 1.08 2.20
No.5 1.79 2.20 1.59 2.20 1.29 1.67
No.6 1.29 1.29 1.15 1.15 1.07 1.07
No.7 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.78 0.78
No.8 1.61 1.85 1.43 1.85 1.26 1.85
No.9 1.57 1.74 1.34 1.74 1.16 1.74
No.10 1.85 1.85 1.67 1.67 1.49 1.51
No.11 1.92 2.20 1.79 2.20 1.71 2.20
No.12 1.99 2.20 1.76 2.20 1.50 2.20
No.13 1.85 1.85 1.69 1.71 1.10 1.17
No.14 2.01 2.20 1.84 2.12 0.91 0.97
No.15 1.35 1.76 1.14 1.76 0.70 0.90
No.16 1.36 1.36 0.62 0.62 0.41 0.41
No.17 1.11 1.17 0.86 0.90 0.82 0.85
No.18 1.10 1.38 1.00 1.38 0.77 1.00
Building
B
2016
Boring
data
Pile length
4.0 m
Pile length
6.0 m
Pile length
8.0 m
OR OR' OR OR' OR OR'
No.1 1.65 1.77 1.19 1.34 0.99 1.32
No.2 1.22 1.30 1.02 1.30 0.92 1.30
No.3 1.29 1.60 0.94 1.19 0.87 1.19
No.4 1.34 1.83 1.20 1.83 1.09 1.83
No.5 1.59 1.83 1.46 1.83 1.25 1.52
No.6 1.25 1.25 1.14 1.14 1.08 1.08
No.7 0.95 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.83
No.8 1.47 1.63 1.35 1.63 1.23 1.63
No.9 1.45 1.56 1.29 1.56 1.15 1.56
No.10 1.63 1.63 1.52 1.52 1.39 1.41
No.11 1.67 1.83 1.59 1.83 1.54 1.83
No.12 1.71 1.83 1.57 1.83 1.40 1.83
No.13 1.63 1.63 1.53 1.54 1.10 1.15
No.14 1.72 1.83 1.62 1.79 0.94 1.00
No.15 1.29 1.57 1.13 1.57 0.76 0.93
No.16 1.30 1.30 0.68 0.68 0.47 0.47
No.17 1.11 1.16 0.90 0.93 0.86 0.89
No.18 1.10 1.31 1.02 1.31 0.82 1.02
Building
E
2016
Boring
data
Pile length
4.0 m
Pile length
6.0 m
Pile length
8.0 m
OR OR' OR OR' OR OR'
No.1 1.72 1.92 1.12 1.30 0.88 1.26
No.2 1.14 1.25 0.92 1.25 0.81 1.25
No.3 1.23 1.66 0.83 1.11 0.76 1.11
No.4 1.30 2.01 1.12 2.01 0.99 2.01
No.5 1.64 2.01 1.46 2.01 1.18 1.53
No.6 1.18 1.18 1.05 1.05 0.98 0.98
No.7 0.84 0.84 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.72
No.8 1.47 1.70 1.31 1.70 1.16 1.70
No.9 1.44 1.60 1.23 1.60 1.07 1.60
No.10 1.69 1.69 1.53 1.53 1.37 1.38
No.11 1.76 2.01 1.64 2.01 1.56 2.01
No.12 1.82 2.01 1.61 2.01 1.37 2.01
No.13 1.69 1.69 1.55 1.56 1.01 1.07
No.14 1.84 2.01 1.68 1.94 0.83 0.89
No.15 1.23 1.61 1.04 1.61 0.64 0.82
No.16 1.25 1.25 0.57 0.57 0.37 0.37
No.17 1.02 1.07 0.78 0.82 0.75 0.78
No.18 1.01 1.26 0.91 1.26 0.70 0.92
NO LOW
MEDIUM HIGH
1.00 ≤ OR < 1.20OR < 1.00
1.20 ≤ OR < 1.50 OR ≥ 1.50
skin friction capacity. In the case of soil liquefaction, increas-
ing the pile length could not affect the potential for building 
overturning in several borings, such as No. 2, No. 4, No. 8, 
No. 9, No. 11, and No. 12, because skin friction capacity is 
constant for all pile lengths, as shown in Table  3. In some 
borings, such as No. 2 and No. 3 with a pile length of 8.0 m, 
the OR exceeded 1.00 when soil liquefaction occurred because 
skin friction force was small and decreased significantly, as 
shown in Table 3.
cOnclUsiOn
Based on the surveyed data, the overturning mechanism of build-
ings in tsunami can be investigated by comparing the overturning 
moment induced by hydrodynamic and buoyancy forces and 
the resisting moment induced by building self-weight and pile 
resistance force. For a pile foundation, the potential for the shear 
failure of the piles at the pile head during the ground shaking can 
be analyzed based on the simplified method in a building design 
liquefaction. For all pile lengths, only boring No. 7 can provide 
safety from building overturning because the OR was less than 
1.00 and including the effect of soil liquefaction. On the other 
hand, boring No. 11 provided the high possibility of building 
overturning for all pile lengths and including the effect of soil 
liquefaction. For borings No. 16 and No. 17, safety can be 
obtained using pile lengths of 6.0 and 8.0 m instead of 4.0 m, 
as was used in boring No. 3. However, building overturning 
could occur at boring No. 3 with pile lengths of 6.0 and 8.0 m 
in the case of soil liquefaction. Nevertheless, increasing the pile 
length can reduce the OR when neglecting the effect of soil 
liquefaction. In particular, for boring No. 14, increasing the 
pile length from 4.0 and 6.0 m to 8.0 m can prevent building 
overturning by changing the classification from high possibility 
to no possibility.
The effect of soil liquefaction generally increased the ORs 
for most of 18 soil boring data. However, the ORs for bor-
ings No. 6 and No. 16 were the same with and without soil 
liquefaction because soil liquefaction could not decrease of 
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standard. In this study, building overturning was investigated 
based on three possible mechanisms:
 1. Building overturning due to hydrodynamic and buoyancy 
forces that were resisted by only building self-weight, such as 
in Buildings A and D.
 2. Tension failure of piles at the pile head caused by the overturn-
ing moment, such as in Building C.
 3. Pulling of the piles from the ground including the effect of 
soil liquefaction, including in combination with shear failure 
during the ground shaking in Building B and combination 
with tension failure during tsunami flow in Building E.
The analysis results of all overturned buildings indicated that 
buoyancy force could generate a larger overturning moment 
than hydrodynamic force, particularly for Buildings C and D. 
Previous studies indicated that the opening ratio had a signifi-
cant effect on buoyancy force. However, the criterion that uses 
opening ratio should not be proposed in building design codes 
because it is difficult to estimate the volume of water inside the 
building during tsunami flow based on the size of the opening. 
This study focused on the performance of building foundations 
during earthquake and subsequent tsunami, including ground 
shaking, soil liquefaction, and tsunami inundation. The possible 
failure mechanism of these overturned buildings was investigated 
based on the residual performance from the earthquake and the 
sequential damage from the tsunami. The results suggested that a 
new criterion of building foundation design should be proposed 
in a building design guideline to prevent building overturning. In 
this criterion, the building performance should be evaluated from 
sequential scenarios of an earthquake and tsunami. The building 
foundation design should consider the states of the art of both 
earthquake and tsunami engineering. Otherwise, the evaluation 
of building performance will be misleading.
Soil liquefaction is a consequence of the earthquake that may 
reduce the performance of building foundation to resist building 
overturning during the tsunami. Due to soil liquefaction, the loss 
of skin friction capacity between the pile and soil could occur in 
most of 18 soil boring data, resulting in a decrease of the resisting 
moment calculated from pile resistance force. However, these 
18 soil boring data are located near the shoreline and not in the 
precise locations of the overturned buildings, which contain 
a considerable amount of sand from filling and sediment. This 
might be a reason why there was a possibility of building over-
turning at most of 18 soil boring data. In addition, skin friction 
capacity including the effect of soil liquefaction was calculated 
by the conventional method in a building design standard. The 
accuracy of the evaluation of the effect of soil liquefaction could 
be improved by using a more advanced method, such as soil 
dynamic analysis.
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